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Abstrak
Komunitas internasional mendorong negara-negara untuk mendukung dan membantu satu sama lain dalam
mengurangi risiko yang berasal dari kesenjangan digital melalui kerja sama internasional. Namun, mereka tidak
dapat menyepakati bagaimana norma-norma internasional berlaku untuk dunia siber, apalagi membentuk dan
mengatur bantuan pembangunan kapasitas keamanan siber (CCB) internasional. Negara-negara menggunakan
bantuan CCB internasional untuk menerapkan norma-norma dunia maya berdasarkan persepsi mereka. Hal ini
menghasilkan variasi dalam bentuk bantuan CCB internasional yang diberikan oleh negara donor. Menggunakan
teori konstruktivisme sosial dan konsep CCB sebagai bantuan internasional, tulisan ini membandingkan praktik
bantuan CCB dari kasus-kasus terpilih di dua negara donor: Jepang dan Korea Selatan. Analisis lebih lanjut
menekankan peran struktur normatif negara donor dalam membentuk identitas, peran, kepentingan, dan perilaku
mereka dalam bantuan CCB internasional. Struktur normatif kerja sama keamanan siber internasional Jepang
membentuk identitas dan peran Jepang yang mengutamakan kepentingan normatif dan material yang dominan
keamanan. Sementara itu, struktur normatif “developmental” Korea Selatan mengonstruksi identitas dan peran
negara yang membentuk normatif pembangunan dan kepentingan material. Bantuan CCB internasional Jepang
sangat berorientasi pada keamanan, sementara Korea Selatan kurang berorientasi pada keamanan. Perbedaan ini
menegaskan fragmentasi norma siber global akibat proses persepsi yang berbeda oleh negara-negara di seluruh
dunia.

Kata kunci:
Bantuan CCB internasional, kesenjangan digital, keamanan siber, Jepang, Korea Selatan

Abstract
The international community encourages states to embrace the international cooperation to support and assist
each other in reducing risks stemming from the digital divide. However, they cannot agree upon how
international norms apply to cyberspace, let alone shaping and regulating international cybersecurity capacity
building (CCB) assistance. States use international CCB assistance to impose cyber-norms based on their
perceptions. It results in different forms of assistance provided by each donor country. Using social
constructivism theory and the CCB concept as international assistance, this paper compares the practice of
CCB assistance from two donor countries: Japan and South Korea. It emphasises the role of each donor
country’s normative structure in shaping their identities, roles, interests, and behaviours in international CCB
assistance. Japan’s international cybersecurity cooperation normative structure shapes Japan’s identities and
roles that prioritise security-dominant normative and material interests. Meanwhile, South Korea’s
developmental focus constructs the country’s identities and roles that shape developmental normative and
material interests. This research finds that Japan’s assistance is highly security-oriented while South Korea’s
is less security-oriented. Their differences highlight the fragmentation of global cyber-norms caused by
different perception processes.

Keywords:
International CCB assistance, digital divide, cybersecurity, Japan, South Korea

109

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 24(1)

INTRODUCTION
The UN General Assembly adopted Resolutions A/RES/68/243 and A/RES/70/237—based
on several reports from the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts or UN GGE
(2010; 2013; 2015) and the United Nations Open-ended Working Group or UN OEWG
(2021)—on the importance of the international assistance on cybersecurity capacity building
(CCB) for tackling the digital divide and its risks. The importance of such agreements is
twofold. First, the international community has successfully securitised the digital divide
problem, a state of inequality among countries in cybersecurity capacity and its advancement
to benefit from the internet (Smith, 2002). Data from the International Telecommunication
Union or ITU (2020) shows internet penetration in developing and least developed countries
in 2019 (44.4% and 19.5%) is still below the world average of 51.4%, let alone developed
countries’ (86.7%). As the global economy is getting digitalised, some countries lacking
digital development cannot benefit from advancements in information and communications
technologies (ICTs). Such a shortcoming will make countries more vulnerable to any cyberrelated threat that can disrupt or destroy critical infrastructures—both physical and virtual
(Hohmann, Pirang, & Benner, 2017, pp. 8-9; van Puyvelde & Brantly, 2019). Moreover,
insecure networks in one place can be abused to disrupt infrastructure around the globe
(Hohmann & Pirang, Why Policymakers Should Care About Weak Digital Infrastructure
Abroad, 2017).
Second, such securitisation results in contesting discourses of CCB in addressing the
digital divide problem. It is clear that UN GGE preferred international CCB assistance to
“reduce risk and enhance security [and to] promote a peaceful, secure, open, and cooperative
ICT environment” (UN GGE, 2015, pp. 10-12; 2013, p. 2). However, the discussion moves
to the realm of politics of international cooperation. The practice of international CCB
assistance—another term is “cybersecurity sharing”—is no different from international
assistance. Both resemble the requirement of a voluntary transfer of resources from one
government or other agencies to support the general development of others (Williams, 2020).
In short, international CCB assistance is being politicised.
Patryk Pawlak’s study (2016) that illustrates this notion by arguing that CCB is a
politicised foreign policy instead of the technocratic process becomes the cornerstone for
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further studies in the field. It derives into two categories of focus: the practical dynamics and
the normative dynamics of international CCB assistance. The former focuses on the donorrecipient relationship in shaping international CCB assistance. It includes each donor and
recipient’s role in driving international CCB assistance and challenges and obstacles in
matching their interests (Schia, 2016; Muller, 2015; Pawlak & Barmpaliou, 2017). Further
studies illustrate such dynamics in specific countries and international/regional organisations
in conducting CCB assistance (Contreras & Barrett, 2020; Calandro & Berglund, 2019;
Crespo, Wanner, & Ghernaouti, 2018; Hitchens & Goren, 2017). The latter focuses on norm
constructions behind international CCB assistance itself. In general, there have been
numerous studies about global cyber norms. There are studies on the theoretical prospect of
constructing global cyber norms and its deadlock within the international community
(Grigsby, 2017; Henriksen, 2019; Hurwitz, 2014; Finnemore & Hollis, 2016). However, only
Zine Homburger’s study that narrows its discussion specifically to the dynamics of
international CCB assistance. He (2019, p. 2) argued that the lack of global cyber norm
causes the politics of international CCB assistance to become a fragmented arena; each donor
country will use CCB assistance to impose its cyber norms preferences toward recipient
countries. Nevertheless, studies conducted by Homburger, and others within this category,
overly focus on the structural level of analysis (“international society-centric”) (Hobson,
2000, p. 149), while studies taking a state-centric approach is still rare. There should be a
study in the field to reveal how cyber norms motivate the donor countries to advance and
implement international CCB assistance towards recipient countries in addressing the digital
divide problem.
Based on this literature gap, this paper posits the research questions: what do the
digital divide and cybersecurity mean for states? How do states interpret their own identities
and roles in international cybersecurity cooperation? What motivates them to implement
international CCB assistance? How do they similarly and differently implement international
CCB assistance? Using social constructivism theory and the concept of CCB as international
assistance, it will comparatively analyse how normative focuses of the two donor countries—
Japan and South Korea—are reflected in different forms of CCB programmes or projects
with recipient countries. It argues that one’s cybersecurity normative structure would define
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its identity/role and normative-material interest in conducting international CCB assistance.
As a result, the corresponding orientation, dimension, and forms of CCB assistance will
follow. However, as Japan’s security-oriented normative structure differs from South
Korea’s non-security-oriented (developmental) one, their identities/roles, normative-material
interests, and practices also differ. This difference highlights the fragmentation of global
cyber-norms.
This paper is structured as follows. First, it will introduce two analytical frameworks
that will be used—CCB as international assistance and “hybrid” social constructivism
theory—along with their operationalisation. It will also introduce the methodology—a
qualitative, case-based comparative research design based on a “pragmatic-constructivist”
research paradigm. Next, it will compare the normative structure of Japan and South Korea
regarding their perception of the digital divide, cybersecurity, and international CCB
assistance at the domestic and international levels. Then, it examines how Japan and South
Korea’s differing normative structures shape their identities/roles and normative-material
interests regarding international cybersecurity cooperation. Those analyses will assess how
the actual practices of Japan’s and South Korea’s international CCB assistance reflect their
respective normative structure, identities/roles, and interests. A brief, additional comment on
reproducing fragmented global cyber norms will conclude this study.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
CCB as International Assistance
UN GGE and UN OEWG reported in 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2021 about the mainstreaming
of CCB as a practice of international assistance. Those reports consistently recommend that
states provide international assistance that includes cooperation to improve ICT stability and
security while preventing harmful pertinent practices, careful consideration on how best to
cooperate in addressing cyber-related threats, and responsiveness to appropriate requests
from the international community for assistance in addressing cyber-related issues.
Many scholars have attempted to formulate a definition for CCB that fits with the
international assistance context. Muller (2015, p. 7), Homburger (2019, p. 4), and Hohmann
et al. (2017, p. 12) emphasise the words like “support,” “assistance,” and “provision” in their
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definition of CCB. The definitions imply the relations between donor and recipient states.
They also reflect the development and security perspectives inferred from the very definition
of cybersecurity. The development perspective is about “how to provide developing nations
with increased access to, and the ability fully benefit from the Internet and cyberspace more
generally.” Meanwhile, the security perspective is about “[…] reducing digital security risks
stemming from access and use of ICTs.” This duality can be flexible because it can be linked
and utilised in approaching security and development issues. Donor countries can impose
political interests through international CCB assistance. Such political imposition can take
forms in the conditionality for the assistance to be delivered, the contested norms, culture,
approach, and institution regarding the CCB governance, or issue linkage.
By combining key points from each definition from the existing studies, this study
proposes the following definition of international CCB assistance: a set of activities, be it
knowledge, technical, or institutional, from donor countries in supporting and assisting
recipient ones to provide, build, and develop their cybersecurity capacity and capability so
they can reap benefit while also reducing risks stemming from access and use of ICTs.
This research also combines findings from several previous studies related to the
definition and typology of international CCB assistance. First, Alexander Klimburg and
Hugo Zylberberg (2015) segmented and dichotomised CCB activities into security-related
and non-security-related official development assistance (ODA) according to the
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD-DAC). Second, the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC)
at the University of Oxford made numerous guidance in developing cybersecurity capacity—
called Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CMM). The list is derived from
five CCB dimensions as follows: (1) policy and strategy, (2) cyberculture and society, (3)
educational training and skills, (4) legal and regulatory frameworks, and (5) standards on
organisations and technologies (GCSCC, 2021, pp. 5-6). Third, Theresa Hitchens and Nilsu
Goren (2017, pp. 5-6) focused on the typology of CCB activities in a framework called
“information sharing agreements,” ranging from training, research, policy, informationexperience sharing, military, cyberoperations, cyber-exercises, cybercrime, and best practice.
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Social Constructivism
Social constructivism argues that social normative structure determines a state’s identity and
interest, resulting in the state’s behaviour in international politics. The normative structure
itself is a set of autonomous and constitutive norms which exist independently from the state
(Hobson, 2000, p. 148). For constructivists, the state’s behaviour follows the “logic of
appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1989).
Hobson (2000, p. 148) identifies three variants of constructivism: (1) international
society-centric, (2) state-centric, and (3) radical or postmodern (further exploration will focus
only on the first two variants). In international society-centric theory, the international realm
becomes the “realm of obligation” consisting of two sub-structures or tiers: the principal
socialising norms and international organisations (Hobson, 2000, p. 150). Any dynamics
from the international level will affect the state’s behaviour to conform to what becomes
internationally recognised “appropriate” behaviours. International society and its principal
normative structure will reproduce themselves (Hobson, 2000, p. 150). Meanwhile, statecentric theory rarely focuses on the international level. There is a dynamic interaction
between domestic normative structure and domestic institutionalisation or state-building
(state-society relations and state-transnational linkage). This “domestic realm focus” affects
the state’s identity, interest, and behaviour (Hobson, 2000, p. 167).
Table 1. Theoretical Framework of Social Constructivism Proposed
Objectives

Tenets

What do digital
divide and
cybersecurity
mean for Japan
and South
Korea?
How do Japan
and South
Korea interpret
their own
identities and
roles in the
context of
international
cybersecurity
cooperation?

Normative
Structure

International Realm

Identity

Role(s)
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Referent Data

Domestic Realm

Japan

South
Korea

Azza Bimantara
Interests

Material
Normative

Policy or
Behaviour
(CCB
orientation,
dimension,
and
activity)

Non-security

What motivates
Japan and
South Korea in
implementing
international
CCB
assistance?
How do Japan
and South
Korea similarly
and differently
implement
international
CCB
assistance?

Cybersecurity
education, training, and
skills
Standards,
organizations, and
technologies
Cyber culture and
society

Security

Legal and regulatory
frameworks

Cybersecurity Policy
and Strategy

Training
Others
Research
Technology
Transfer
Others
Information
sharing & Best
practices
Promotion of
development
awareness
Others
Cybercrime &
Cyber-operation
Legal & Judicial
Development
Others
Military
Policy and
Strategy
Security System
Management and
Reform
Cyber-exercise
Others

Source: Author

This study aims to combine both variants by integrating the “international realm”
variable with the “domestic realm” variable and framing them as a new normative structure.
This structure concerning international cybersecurity governance and cooperation affects the
state’s identity, interest, and behaviour in international CCB assistance. Table 1 illustrates
this paper’s analytical framework operationalisation.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study follows what David L. Morgan (2007, p. 67), Thi Tuyet Tran (2017), and John W.
Creswell (2013, pp. 9-10) termed a “pragmatic-constructivist” research paradigm. It seeks
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the “middle ground” of tension between the objectivity of observable phenomenon of CCB
as international assistance as part of inter-state behaviours (e.g., the network of actors,
institutions, material capabilities) and its inherent tendency to be driven by “nonmaterial/intangible factors” (e.g., norms, identities, and ideas). It manifests in a case-based
comparative analysis design, which tries to compare a limited number of cases in return for
more exploration of numerous “variables” to thicken the description. The definitive
conceptualisation or theorisation within the research is constructed simultaneously with the
research progress, and the case selection would be very paradigmatic according to the
research purpose (della Porta, 2008, p. 208).
There are several reasons behind the selection of Japan and South Korea in this study.
First, this research attempts to make a breakthrough by departing from mainstream studies in
the field whose focus is on Western cybersecurity profiles—e.g., US, UK, European Union
(EU), Council of Europe (CoE), Russia, and others. Second, according to Global
Cybersecurity Index (GCI) in 2018, ITU (2019a, pp. 14, 62) categorised Japan (with GCI
0.880) and South Korea (with GCI 0.873) as countries with a “high-level commitment”
toward cybersecurity. The third is that Japan and South Korea, as developed countries, have
strong traditions of being donor countries. Their membership status within the OECD-DAC
(OECD, 2021) and their respective reputable international cooperation agencies—Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA)—support the premise.
This research obtained data that consisted of two referent sets: (1) the general national
cybersecurity profile of Japan and South Korea and (2) international CCB assistance
activities/programmes/projects conducted by Japan and South Korea. The data are primarily
qualitative from primary or secondary sources (see Table 2) found through desk-study
activity (Lamont, 2015, pp. 79-91). The method of the data analysis will be qualitative, with
a tendency to go to both content and discourse analysis (Johannesson & Perjon, 2014, p. 65).
The data will be positioned and analysed based on this paper’s analytical framework and
writing structure.
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Table 2. List of Referent Data Proposed
Referent Data
like…
Cybersecurity
Profile

International
CCB Assistance
Activity /
Program /
Project

That indicate…

To find…

In the form of … that can be found
in…
Norm
• Official documents
o National government websites
Identity
o International organization website
Interest
(e.g.: UNIDIR)
Behaviour • Archives
o Catalogue (e.g.: Cybil.org)
• Media report
o Journalistic website
• Academic sources
o Books, journal articles, research
reports, etc.
• Other web-based information source

Policy/Strategy
•
Institution
•
Actor/Agency Mapping
•
Public Discourse or Narrative
Resource transfer—
•
(in)tangible
From donor country’s
government or official
agency
Toward recipient country as
developing one in sense of
both economic development
and ICT advancement
Source: Author

DISCUSSION
Structuring The Meaning Of The Digital Divide And Cyber-Norms
International-level Normative Structure
Japan and South Korea have several similarities in their international normative structure.
First, both countries are active participants of UN GGE. Both countries and other participants
managed to formulise eleven voluntary, non-binding norms, rules, or principles of
responsible behaviour of states to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful
ICT environment (UN GGE, 2013; 2015; UN General Assembly, 2021). Out of eleven cybernorms, three address the importance of international cooperation in tackling the digital
divide: (1) cooperation in increasing stability and security in the use of ICTs; (2)
consideration of how best to cooperate against cybercrime; (3) responding to appropriate
requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is vulnerable. These
cyber norms simultaneously “teach” UN member states, including Japan and South Korea,
to participate in international cybersecurity cooperation, particularly international CCB
assistance, to narrow the digital divide.
Second, both countries are active members of ITU, an UN-backed ICT agency.
Membership in ITU has “encouraged” countries like Japan and South Korea to prioritise
conducting CCB cooperation, particularly with developing countries. It is shown by two ITU
events regarding spam-combating and computer incident response teams (CIRTs) facilitation
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worldwide: World Telecommunication Development Conference (WTDC) and World
Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA) (ITU, 2021). Third, both are the
only Asian countries that have become members of OECD-DAC. Such memberships oblige
Japan and South Korea, two developed nations, to actively participate in ODA. OECD-DAC
members recommend international CCB assistance as one of the development agendas to
facilitate cybersecurity cooperation at policy and operational levels across political,
economic, and social issues (OECD, 2012, pp. 51, 72).
However, Japan has become a member of the Convention on Cybercrime, also known
as the Budapest Convention (Council of Europe, 2021), while South Korea is not a party to
the Convention. It is the first international treaty to address cyber-related crime, cyberterrorism, and cyber discrimination by harmonising national laws, improving investigative
techniques, and increasing cooperation among nations (Council of Europe, 2001; Schmitt,
2017). By being a party to the Convention, Japan’s cybersecurity governance is becoming
security-oriented. The Budapest Convention influences Japan’s cybersecurity paradigm to be
more oriented towards traditional security. Unlike Japan, traditional security is not the
determinant for South Korean norms on cybersecurity governance and international CCB
assistance.
Japan’s Perceptions of the Digital Divide and Cyber-Norms
The Japanese perspective on the digital divide combines infrastructural and socio-economic
(i.e., intergenerational) perspectives. The problem of the digital divide Japan is experiencing
is caused by the fact that internet penetration in Japan is centralised in Honshu Island
(Nishida, Pick, & Sarkar, 2014, pp. 1000-1003). Moreover, the number of older people using
the internet is far fewer than the younger population (Chen & Wellman, 2004, p. 23; Nishida,
Pick, & Sarkar, 2014, p. 1009). Despite an initial increase in broadband access by the
Japanese Government, the intergenerational digital divide is yet to be solved.
Japan’s cybersecurity governance is state-led. There are two factors: strong state
guidance and weak-to-moderate societal ventures. Japanese cybersecurity governance is
highly centralised under the Prime Minister of Japan and its Cabinet (Secretariat), Ministry
of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Ministry of Justice,
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Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),
Cyber Attack Analysis Council and National Public Safety Commission. Stefan Soesanto
(2020, p. 30) said that these governmental bodies create more innovation in cybersecurity
governance than private sectors or civil society. On the other hand, the role of private or civil
society is weak and less self-incentivised. Japanese business leaders lack the technical
expertise and experience necessary to make good cybersecurity decisions (Matsubara, 2018).
They view cybersecurity as corporate social responsibility practice instead of an asset or
investment to improve competitiveness (Matsubara, 2018).
Norms regarding cybersecurity governance adopted by the Japanese Government are
also highly securitised for two reasons. First, the Japanese governmental bodies previously
mentioned are all elites of the Japanese “security community” and “intelligence community.”
Despite the presence of METI in the policy-making process, its influence is still undermined
by the higher government bodies like the Ministry of Defence and the National Public Safety
Commission (Soesanto, 2020, pp. 20, 22-24). Consequently, policy areas specialised by
Japan’s cybersecurity governance are mainly around cybercrime, cyber terror, and cyber
defence. Japanese cybersecurity strategy and laws reflect what Lene Hansen and Helen
Nissenbaum (2009, pp. 1163-1165) refer to as “hyper-securitisation.” The Japanese security
community used past cybercrime events, cyber terrorism, and cyber defence incidents and
even imagined the worst cyber-threat scenario to justify the sophisticated evolution of
national cybersecurity strategy. They evolved from the 2000 Basic Act and Special Action
Plan to two National Strategies on Information Security to three Cybersecurity Strategies
between 2013 and 2018, introducing the Basic Act on Cybersecurity in 2014. Japanese
cybersecurity governance also refers to National Defence Guidelines and Japan-US Defence
Guidelines to narrate a “toward-militaristic” approach to cybersecurity (Soesanto, 2020, pp.
12-17, 24-25).
Second, geopolitically speaking, Japan expands its “defence perimeter” in cyberspace
to cover neighbouring actors, both states and regional organisations, while avoiding a direct
cyber-dialogue with China. Japan-ASEAN CCB cooperation becomes an instrument to foster
the Japan-ASEAN security community and environment amidst the growing cyber threat
from China (Larasati, 2018, pp. 92-93). The trilateral meeting between US, Japan, and South
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Korean vice foreign ministers on cybersecurity policy coordination and cooperation also
responds to the growing threat of North Korea in terms of nuclear weapons as well as other
security issues. The meeting addressed issues of critical infrastructure, cyber-threats, and
cyber-trend (US Embassy and Consulate in the Republic of Korea, 2017). The expansion of
Japan’s cooperation toward Europe, for example through the Japan-EU Cyber Dialogue in
2014, follows the same logic. Third, there is a growing trend of Japan militarising its response
toward cyber threats. Japanese MOD and SDF have developed a cyber doctrine for domestic
defence and increasingly international cooperative purposes (Kallender & Hughes, 2017, p.
129). Japanese MOD (2010, pp. 184-185) issued a White Paper announcing the ‘Six Pillars
of Comprehensive Defence Against Cyber Attacks,’ which emphasises digitalising military
defence capabilities against any cyber-related threat.
In short, Japan’s security-oriented cybersecurity governance at the domestic level and
cooperative approach and security orientation on cybersecurity influence Japan’s normative
structure for international CCB cooperation to be security-oriented.
South Korean Perception of the Digital Divide and Cyber-Norms
The socio-economic perspective has dominated South Korea’s experience with the digital
divide. Its digital divide seems to be increasing along the lines of income and education (Chen
& Wellman, 2004, p. 23). Despite the 97% rate of national internet penetration in January
2021 (Kemp, 2021), the rate for the physically disabled, elderly, people living in rural areas,
and low-income earners is far slower (Yonhap News Agency, 2020). Moreover, the
deployment of ICTs in the various socio-economic frameworks, such as education, happens
because Korea has limited natural resources and depends on a knowledge-based economy to
remain economically viable and competent (Sedimo, Bwalya, & Plessis, 2011).
Although societal-cultural acceptance towards the Government’s intervention in ICT
infrastructure advancement in South Korea is high, South Korea’s perception of other forms
of Government cyberspace intervention is different. Concerning its state-society relations in
cybersecurity governance, South Korea’s national institution consists of moderate state
intervention with moderate-to-strong societal hesitation. Three factors explain this situation.
First, public-private partnership in South Korean cybersecurity governance is minimal (Kim
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D. , 2019, pp. 79-80). Second, South Korea’s administrative system and legal framework in
cybersecurity affairs are scattered without the proper mechanism to integrate them into a
more unified governance. There are many governmental bodies including the National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC) under the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Korean Internet and
Security Agency (KISA) under the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT), Cyber Command
under the Ministry of National Defence (MND), and Cyber Bureau under National Police
Agency (KNPA). There are also three sets of complex laws on the internet and information
security in Korea: laws on promotion of the internet and the internet industry, laws on
cybersecurity, and laws on personal information protection (KISA, 2021). However, South
Korea’s scattered and inadequate cybersecurity policies/bodies resulted in difficulties in
deterring North Korea (Park P. , 2018; Kim D. , 2019, p. 58). Third, South Korean
Government’s effort to incorporate civil society to support and champion cybersecurity
governance advancement is difficult. South Korean civil society, in general, is suspicious of
any South Korean policy that aims to regulate the public sphere that, in general, is supposed
to be an open, accessible, and democratic domain. Such fear is justified based on the history
of South Korean authoritarianism around the 1970s and 1980s regarding civil surveillance
and domestic political interference (Park D. , 2016).
Norms regarding cybersecurity governance in South Korea are a mixture of securityoriented and economic development-oriented. South Korea’s cyber defence to deter the
imminent threat, mainly from North Korea and China, and the presence of a “security
community” that holds responsibility for governing cybersecurity, such as NCSC, KISA,
NCC, and Cyber Bureau, strengthen the notion of security orientation (Bartlett, 2018, p. 29).
However, the degree of securitisation of South Korean cybersecurity is not as high as Japan.
The main factor lies in the competing economic development orientation of cybersecurity
governance. MSIT, playing a vital role in South Korean cybersecurity governance, represents
the national legacy of economic and financial guidance and bureaucratic-political interest in
promoting South Korean science and technological advancement. “National legacy” means
a political-economic culture during the 1970s-1980s that played a “stronger” interventionist
role, relying more on top-down orders (Bartlett, 2018, pp. 30-31). The “bureaucratic-political
interests” mean that MSIT’s aim to assure South Korea’s cybersecurity policy can promote
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South Korean science and technological advancement which would also serve the interests
of the ICT industries (Kim D. , 2019, p. 68; Bartlett, 2018, pp. 31-32).
In short, South Korea has fostered a “developmental” orientation of cybersecurity
governance

while

embracing

a

cooperative-with-low-securitisation

approach

to

cybersecurity and CCB. These made the South Korean normative structure for international
CCB cooperation “developmental.”
Defining Identities And Roles Within The Context Of International Cybersecurity
Cooperation
Japan’s Identity and Role Conception in International Cybersecurity Cooperation
It is generally agreed that Japan’s international identity changed from a pre-war “warmonger”
nation to a post-war “pacifist” one. Pre-war Japan held several identities, such as “militarist”
and “authoritarian,” “imperialist,” and “aggressor” or “bullying country” or “a strong
country” (Katzenstein, 1996; Hobson, 2000, pp. 167-169; Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, p.
9). All those identities and role enactment dramatically changed after the defeat of Japan in
World War II. The rest of the twentieth century saw a slow yet incremental reverse of those
identities and roles to become a “post-war pacifist” Japan: “anti-militarist,” “economic
power,” “developmental state,” a “cooperative” member of the international community, and
“weak” at some point (Tonami, 2018, pp. 1211-1212; Kono, 1999; Yasushi & McConnell,
2008; Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, pp. 12-14). The contemporary period of Japan’s
international relations, particularly during the second term of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
(2012-2020), witness another change in Japan’s identity within international politics. This
study proposes the term “revisionist” identity, inspired by Abe’s effort to reinterpret Article
9 of the Japanese Constitution to benefit the Japanese SDF’s remilitarisation. He embraced
this kind of identity to seek a balance between two previous contrasting identities. He tried
to present Japan as a nation that is (1) “cooperative” yet “assertive,” (2) “strong” yet “not a
bully,” and (3) becoming a “military and economic power” yet “democratic and human rights
champion.”
By linking the pertinent evolution of Japan’s identity with the context of international
cybersecurity cooperation, the security-oriented normative structure has shaped Japan’s
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identity/role into a “responsible global cybersecurity stakeholder” in promoting peaceful and
secure global cyberspace. Through bilateral and multilateral cyber diplomacy, Japan has
become one of the responsible countries in shaping international collective action to ensure
a free, fair, and secure cyber-space (Matsubara & Mochinaga, 2021, p. 25). To be
“responsible” globally, Japan needs to be “digitally strong” as a regional and global cyber
power. As the cyber threat is growing and even militarised, strengthening cyber defence
capabilities is a viable option for Japan. It mainly deters advanced persistent threats (APTs)
to Japanese cyberspace from China, North Korea, and Russia (NIDS, 2014, pp. 52-53).
Moreover, due to its “cooperative/assertive” identity/role that cannot be achieved alone,
Japan needs to embrace international cybersecurity cooperation. Such an urgency has been
supported by Japan’s reputation for being a country with high capabilities of being a partner
and even donor in much international cooperation and assistance and a thrust to become a
globally responsible cybersecurity stakeholder (Menocal, 2011).
In short, Japan’s security-oriented international cybersecurity cooperation normative
structure combined with previously discussed “revisionist” identity and role in foreign policy
results in Japan’s strive for the following identity and role within international cybersecurity
cooperation: a “cyber-power” with urgency and responsibility to contribute towards peaceful
and secure global/regional cybersecurity on behalf of Japan’s security interests.
South Korean Identity and Role Conception in International Cybersecurity Cooperation
South Korea was initially a minor power. The most popular proverb to describe South
Korea’s position within international politics is “a shrimp among whales,” describing its role
in the past as the geopolitical pivot for great power politics throughout history (Park S. J.,
2015, p. 3). South Korea was also a “developing nation” due to its identity as an “international
development beneficiary nation” of ODA by OECD. After the 1990s democratisation and
post-1997-crisis national economic development consolidation, South Korea has become
more stable internally.
Scholars like Heike Hermanns (2013), Jongryn Mo (2016), Leif-Eric Easley & Kyuri
Park (2017), Moch Faisal Karim (2018), Patrick Flamm (2019), Sook-Jong Lee (2012), and
Jeffrey Robertson (2007) agreed that South Korea has transformed into a middle power.
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Flamm (2019, pp. 136-141) identified three identities/roles of South Korea as a middle
power: “Rising Korea,” “Leading Korea,” and “Righteous Korea.” “Rising Korea” indicates
South Korea’s rising role in international relations. The roles derived from such identity
range from being a “bridge between worlds,” “responsible middle power,” and “economic
power.” Starting from President Roh Tae-woo’s pursuit of South Korean status as a
“mediator” between developing and developed countries or Western and Non-Western
countries (Karim, 2018, p. 356), South Korea aims to become a “responsible middle power.”
In doing so, President Lee-Myung-bak’s terminology of “Global Korea” in harmonising its
interests with other global actors (Lee M.-b. , 2009) and South Korea’s recent economic
prowess become the foundation for “Rising Korea.” “Leading Korea” means South Korea
wants to be a global role model (Flamm, 2019, pp. 138-140). Combined with the “Global
Korea” identity, it refers to South Korea’s national image and brand-building and exportation
of South Korean culture to a global audience. People-oriented soft power diplomacy is vital
for South Korea’s global popularity—e.g., Hallyu and the innovation model (Hermanns,
2013, pp. 75-76; Jamrisko & Wei, 2020). “Righteous Korea” refers to South Korean
international identity/role as a “peaceful and cooperative” nation contributing towards world
peace, security, and order (Flamm, 2019, pp. 140-141). Its role enactment involves South
Korea’s activism in international cooperation—whether it is security issues or economic
development and cooperation issues—and becoming an agenda-setter (Mo, 2016, p. 594).
For example, South Korea successfully changed its “beneficiary” status to a “benefactor” and
“developed country” identity by joining OECD-DAC High-Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in 2011. The forum founded the Busan Partnership Agreement for Effective
Development Co-operation (OECD, 2011).
If we link South Korea’s identity evolution with its normative structure of
international cybersecurity cooperation that is “developmental,” we can see that the identity
of “Rising Korea” has shaped South Korea’s identity into one of the “world ICT leaders.” It
was testified by ITU (2018) while describing how government interventions and investments
in modern technology since the 1950s have been responsible for South Korean recent digital
economic boom. The international community expects South Korea, now leading the world’s
ICT advancement, to play a contributive role in the cybersecurity sector (Kim S. , 2014, p.
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324). From the “Leading/Rising Korea” identities, there are three recognisable roles: “strong
internet nation,” “pioneer of the digital “new deal,” and a “leader in cyber-diplomacy.” South
Korea is home to several giant ICT corporations, such as Samsung, LG, SK, and KT, the
fastest internet connection in the world (Pulse, 2020), a global pioneer for a “digital new
deal,” according to President Moon Jae-in (2020), and a reputable country for its eGovernment. South Korean cyber diplomacy is directed into two segments of the “Righteous
Korea” identity/role. The first one is to incorporate South Korean cultural assets with their
diplomatic goals to promote the national brand/image to the global audience. In this context,
South Korea is better than Japan in incorporating its cultural assets with its diplomatic goals
in the international community (Park, Chung, & Park, 2019, p. 1481). The second one is
cyber diplomacy to set the agenda of international cybersecurity cooperation, such as
promoting peaceful and secure global cyberspace, mediating cyber conflicts, and other forms
of cybersecurity cooperation, namely international CCB assistance.
In short, South Korea’s “developmental” international cybersecurity cooperation
normative structure combined with its “middle-power” status results in the following identity
and role within international cybersecurity cooperation: a “cyber middle power” for the
mutual development of the international community’s cyber capabilities.
Explaining Interests In Motivating International CCB Assistance
Japan’s Motives
Japan’s normative structure, identities, and roles in international cybersecurity governance
discussed in the previous section contribute to Japan’s normative and material interests in
conducting international CCB assistance. There are three normative interests (Vosse, 2019,
p. 3). First, Japan wants to ensure that the international community approaches international
cybersecurity governance through multilateral and bilateral partnerships. Second, Japan aims
to proliferate the norms of cooperative approach in building cyber capacity towards recipient
countries. Third, being the party to the Budapest Convention, Japan is obliged to govern its
cyberspace with respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Japan explicitly
combats any cyber related crime within its cyberspace and within its capacity. Consequently,
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Japan aspires to ensure that other countries follow a similar path as active players in
international cybersecurity governance.
There are several material drivers for Japan’s international CCB assistance. The first
is related to “prestige.” Conducting international CCB assistance will help Japan build such
an image in which recipient countries will perceive Japan as a role model in CCB that should
be followed and preferred for future CCB projects. Second, in terms of “politico-diplomatic”
concerns, international CCB assistance is a good option for Japan’s confidence-building
measures (CBMs) (Maiese, 2003). It means that if Japan cooperates and even assists
developing countries in building cyber capacity, Japan’s own cyber capabilities will not be
feared even if Japan’s cybersecurity is getting militarised. Third, regarding “security”
consideration, Japan considered international CCB assistance as an instrument to promote a
better way to build cybersecurity capacities following what donors idealise as “peaceful and
secured cyberspace.” Because Japan’s national cybersecurity depends on international
dynamics, helping other countries build their cyber-capacity will also strengthen Japan’s
national security. Lastly, in terms of “commerce,” if Japan helps CCB in developing
countries, it can simultaneously promote it socio-economic development and create a market
for foreign economies. Moreover, international CCB assistance allows Japan to export its
defence mechanisms to other countries.
South Korean Motives
Like Japan, South Korea’s international CCB assistance has its normative and material
components that constitute its interests worldwide. In terms of normative components, South
Korea’s international CCB assistance aims to promote international partnerships and
cooperation in cybersecurity by enriching prevalent bilateral and multilateral cooperation
systems (National Security Office of the Republic of Korea, 2017, p. 23). The international
community, including the UN GGE and UN OEWG, has “taught” South Korea to conduct
CCB cooperation with other countries to develop cyber capacities together and reproduce the
cyber-norms toward other countries (Ebert & Groenendaal, 2020, p. 25). South Korea’s
international CCB assistance also promotes developmental norms. South Korea is committed
to conducting CCB assistance toward other countries to narrow the digital gap that results in
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cyber risks, poverty, and economic stagnation (Ebert & Groenendaal, 2020, p. 23; Hohmann
& Pirang, 2017).
There are also South Korea’s material interests in international CCB assistance:
“security,” “prestige,” and “politico-diplomacy.” Like Japan, South Korea’s cybersecurity
profile is enmeshed in Asia-Pacific dynamics, involving considerable risk of cyberconflict
with technically advanced countries like China, North Korea, and Russia and the prevalence
of regional disputes. By conducting CCB assistance towards recipient countries nearby,
South Korea can geopolitically assure its cybersecurity within the region from any cyberrelated risk from the external realm. Nevertheless, “security measures” do not necessarily
affect or shape its normative interest like Japan. Because it is not a party to the Budapest
Convention, South Korea does not internalise security-oriented cybersecurity governance, let
alone CCB. Instead, it creates a more “developmental” orientation. In terms of “prestige,”
South Korea’s National Security Office (2017, p. 24) aims to expand foreign assistance
projects for cybersecurity capacity building to developing countries in a reciprocal manner
and share cybersecurity technologies and systems. By conducting CCB assistance with other
countries, South Korea aims to enact its “Global Korea” role in CCB governance and build
a reputation as an international role model for CCB governance. In terms of “politicodiplomatic” interests, international CCB assistance can be used to make issue linkage. South
Korea’s ODA combines non-traditional security concerns, such as development, with
cybersecurity (Kim S. , 2014, p. 7). In collaboration with the World Bank, one obvious result
of South Korea’s cyber diplomacy is to establish two CCB assistance projects: “Combatting
Cybercrime: Tools and Capacity Building for Emerging Economies” and “Global Cyber
Security Capacity Program.”
The Practice Of International CCB Assistance
An Explanation for Japan’s Performance
Around 24 projects of Japan’s international CCB in the region take all forms, except
technology transfer, legal and judicial development, and military. Although Japan’s material
interests in providing international CCB assistance include “security” considerations,
securitising and militarising cyber-related issues are sensitive, especially for its Southeast
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Asian (SEA) counterparts. Henceforth, Japan’s approach in conducting security-oriented
CCB programmes focuses more on legal and regulatory frameworks and comprehensive
policy and strategy. Nevertheless, Japan’s security-oriented CCB programmes for its
recipients ranges from cybercrime eradication and cyber-operations policy and strategy
development (MOFA Japan, 2019; 2019; GFCE, 2016; INTERPOL, 2018; NISC, 2015;
2018), to security system management and reform (ASEAN, 2016, p. 4; ICT4Peace, 2018;
JICA, 2013; 2019a), and even cyber exercise (ID-SIRTII/CC, 2017; AJCCBC, 2018; JAIF,
2018; METI Japan, 2020; Tajima, 2020). Meanwhile, Japan’s non-security-oriented CCB
projects focus on cybersecurity education, training, skills, standards, organisations,
technologies, and cyberculture and society. They include training (NISC, 2015; JICA, 2018;
2019b; 2020; METI Japan, 2021), research (Laskar & Sarkar, 2020), information and best
practices-sharing (NISC, 2015), and promotion of ICT development awareness (NISC,
2015).
The ratio between security-oriented and non-security-oriented projects is fifteen to
nine. Most of the projects are conducted through engagement between Japan’s cyber security
bodies and their counterparts, proving the linearity of security-oriented approach with its
material and normative interests, identity/role, and normative structure.
An Explanation for South Korean Performance
South Korea has around sixteen international CCB projects without forms of technology
transfer, legal and judicial development, security system management and reform, cyberexercise, and military. The recipient countries are diverse, ranging from the Balkans to
African countries. The projects are mostly integrated and institutionalised under
collaboration with international organisations. Take cybercrime eradication & cyber
operations as an example. Through its National Police Agency (KNPA), the South Korean
Government will fund INTERPOL projects around EUR 4.4 million to combat cybercrime,
including child sexual abuse and cyber-enabled financial crime (INTERPOL, 2020).
However, South Korea does not fully participate in the programme’s technical and
operational affairs.
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Another example is the “Global Cybersecurity Capacity Program” (GCCP). It is an
initiative taken by the World Bank and financed by the South Korean Government through a
scheme called the Korea World Bank Partnership Facility (KWPF) to bridge existing gaps in
the cybersecurity capacities of its client countries. GCCP took limited forms of CCB
assistance, such as training (World Bank, 2019, pp. 21-57), information sharing and best
practices (World Bank, 2019, p. 50), promotion of development awareness (World Bank,
2020), and policy and strategy (World Bank, 2019, p. 43) They were conducted in two
phases: “Phase I” and “Phase II.” In its “Phase I,” the programme has assisted six countries—
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan,
and Myanmar—in strengthening cybersecurity capacities between 2016 and 2019 (World
Bank, 2019, p. 4). Its “Phase II” will engage other countries like Kosovo, Serbia, and more
in 2020-2021 (World Bank, 2020).
Outside the GCCP framework is the Korea-Indonesia ICT Training Centre for
technology transfer (Embassy of the Republic of Korea for the Republic of Indonesia, 2011).
South Korea established a cybersecurity centre at the Bandung Institute of Technology to
research and promote development awareness (Kusumastuti, 2015). It is similar to ASEAN
Cyber University which is also South Korean programme (ACU Project, 2012). South Korea
also cooperate with China and India on information and best practices-sharing, particularly
in CIRTs (Hitchens & Goren, 2017, pp. 70, 99).
The ratio between security-oriented and non-security-oriented projects is fourteen to
two. It proves that the South Korean approach to CCB projects is less security-oriented.
Instead of cyber security bodies, they engaged more with economic and development
institutions in conducting the projects. Henceforth, South Korea’s performance in
international CCB assistance established the “developmental notion” and consistent with its
normative structure, identity/role, and material-normative interests.
Additional Discussion
Table 3 summarises the previously discussed comparison between Japan’s and South Korea’s
international CCB assistance over the last decade based on their project quantity,
orientations, dimensions, and forms. It collects any international CCB project that shows two
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attributes: (1) any resource transfer related to CCB assistance activities, tangible or
intangible, from Japanese and South Korean Governments or official agencies and (2) the
status of recipient countries, which can be considered developing if measured by their
economic development and ICT advancement. They reflect policy orientation or behaviour
related to international CCB assistance. Therefore, both countries’ engagement with, for
example, China and India, despite the latter’s economic prowess, still counts in this manner.
Table 3. Comparative List of Japan and South Korea’s International CCB Projects
Orientation
Nonsecurity
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Dimensions
Cybersecurity
education,
training, and
skills

Forms
Training

Standards,
organisations,
and
technologies
Cyber culture
and society

Research

Japan
• The 1st ASEAN-Japan
Information Security
Training (Tokyo, 23 - 27
August 2010)
• Project on Capacity
Building for Cyber
Security in Vietnam (26
June 2019 – 25
November 2021)
• Project for Human
Resources Development
for Cyber Security
Professionals (22 May
2019 – 21 May 2024)
• Japan - US Industrial
Control Systems
Cybersecurity Week for
the Indo-Pacific Region
in FY2020—in
cooperation with US
DHS (8-12 March 2021,
Online)
• Capacity Building in
Policy Formation for
Enhancement of
Measures to Ensure
Cybersecurity in ASEAN
Region (JanuaryFebruary 2020)
• India-Japan Finalisation
of 5G and AI cooperation
(October 2020)

Information • The 1st ASEAN-Japan
sharing &
Information Security
best practice
Policy Meeting (Tokyo
24 - 26 February 2009)

South Korea
• Korea-Indonesia ICT
Training Centre (since
2011)
• GCCP (Technical
Assistance & Workshop) in
Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek on 2526 April 2018)
• GCCP (Workshop) in North
Macedonia (Skopje, 2-3
April 2018)
• GCCP (Workshop) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Sarajevo, 3-4 December
2018)

• Cybersecurity Centre in
Indonesian University
(since 2015)
• GCCP (Seminar) in Albania
(Tirana, 6-7 December
2018)
• MoU between South
Korea's Ministry of Science,
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Promotion
• The 2nd ASEAN-Japan
of
Government Network
development
Security Workshop
awareness
(Hanoi, 16 - 17
December 2010)
• ASEAN-Japan Joint
Information Security
Awareness Raising
Initiatives (November
2011)
Security

Legal and
regulatory
frameworks

Cybercrime
eradication
& cyberoperation

Cybersecurity
policy and
strategy

Policy and
strategy

ICT & Future Planning, and
China's Ministry of Industry
and Information
Technology (January 2014)
• MoU between Korean and
Indian CERT (16 January
2014)
• ASEAN Cyber University
(since January 2009)
• GCCP (Seminar) in Ghana
(since 2019)
• GCCP (Seminar) in
Myanmar (since 2019)
• GCCP (Seminar) in Kosovo
(since 2019)
• GCCP (Seminar) in Serbia
(since 2019)
• GCCP (Seminar) in
Montenegro (since 2019)
• Korean Fund for
INTERPOL’s Fight Against
Child (Sexual) Exploitation
(FACE) project & cyberenabled financial crime
(2020)

• The 3rd ASEAN-Japan
Cybercrime Dialogue
(Bandar Seri Begawan,
23-24 January 2019)
• Countermeasures
Against Cybercrime by
JICA 2015
• Preventing and
Combating Cybercrime
in Southeast Asia—in
cooperation with GFCE
and UNODC (since
2016)
• ASEAN Cybercrime
Operations Desk—in
cooperation with
INTERPOL (July 2018)
• Agreement between
CERT India and Japan
Computer Emergency
Response Team
Coordination Centre
(JPCERT/CC) (January
2015)
• The 1st ASEAN-Japan
• GCCP (Technical
Government Network
Assistance) in North
Security Workshop
Macedonia (Skopje, 2-3
(Tokyo, 21 - 22 October
April 2018)
2009)
• The 2nd & 3rd ASEANJapan Information
Security Policy Meeting
(Bangkok 29 - 31 March
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2010; Tokyo, 7 - 8
March 2011)
• Annual CIIP Workshops
in ASEAN (20 October
2016)
• International Cyber
Security Policy and
Capacity Workshop for
ASEAN Countries—in
cooperation with UK and
ICT4Peace Foundation
(April 2017 - March
2018)
Security
• ASEAN – Japan
system
Cybersecurity Working
management
Group/Policy Meeting
and reform
(Tokyo, 16-17 October
2018)
• Improvement of
Information Security
Response Capacity in
Indonesian Government
(23 July 2014 - 22
January 2017)
• ANC-JICA-Id-SIRTII
Cyber Security
Seminar—in partnership
with Indonesia (Dili, 8
February 2019)
• [The Establishment of
the] ASEAN-Japan
Cybersecurity Capacity
Building Centre [and its
"Step 2] (Bangkok,
2018)
Cyber• Annual Cyber Exercises
exercise
in ASEAN (March
2013- December 2021)
• Japan-ASEAN0US-EU
Cyber-defence drill
(planned in 2020-2021)
Source: Author

_

_

Two caveats are important in this comparison. First, it excludes three forms of CCB
projects—technology transfer, legal and judicial development, and military—because neither
Japan nor South Korea conduct them. Second, it must be admitted that there are slight
differences in comparing data from Japanese and South Korean practices. While data from
the former mainly focused on cooperation with SEA counterparts, data from the latter show
more diversity in terms of regional partners.
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Such “unfair comparison” can be justified. Empirically speaking, Japan has more
region-focused international CCB assistance than South Korea’s, which is more diverse.
Most of Japan’s international CCB recipients come from the SEA region, namely ASEAN
member states. It happens because Japan realises the importance of the region’s cybersecurity
capacity and its impact toward regional cybersecurity governance more than South Korea
does. SEA have several issues regarding the digital divide, in terms of internet penetration
(Ingram, 2020, p. 8; World Bank, 2021), digital gender gaps (ITU, 2019b, pp. 4, 6), unequal
distribution of ICT skills (ITU, 2019b, p. 10), exploitable unsecured infrastructures (Raska
& Ang, 2018, p. 2), insufficient strategic mindset, policy preparedness, and institutional
oversight (Ingram, 2020, p. 18), business community’s reluctancy to deal with cyber-risks,
lack of human resources and infrastructures, and infancy of cyber-culture within society and
state. In this case, Japan takes geopolitical measures into account more than South Korea
does. Such findings are consistent with the initial analysis this study has explicated in
previous sections, concerning the linearity between the normative structure, identities/roles,
normative-material interests, and state policy (i.e., international CCB assistance). Therefore,
the data difference precisely confirms the initial premises and analyses this study proposes.
CONCLUSION
Based on the conceptualisation of CCB as a practice of international assistance and social
constructivism theory, this study concluded the role of normative structure, identity/role
enactment, and interest configuration in shaping states’ orientation in international CCB
assistance. When specific normative structure—a combination of the international “realm of
cybersecurity obligation” and domestic “realm of national cybersecurity institution”—
interacts with the country’s preceding identities and roles in general foreign policy, the
process configures pertinent country’s normative and material interests that genuinely drives
a country to conduct international CCB assistance. Thus, the orientations, dimensions, and
forms of activities/programmes/projects will manifest and reproduce the given normative
structure and perceived identities/roles.
The two study cases from Japan and South Korea justify the argument. Japan’s
security-oriented normative structure in international cybersecurity has shaped Japan’s
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identity and role in international cybersecurity governance to be a country with securitydominant normative and material interests. Therefore, Japan’s international CCB assistance
has been highly security-oriented. Meanwhile, South Korea’s “developmental” international
cybersecurity normative structure embraces South Korea’s well-known reputation in the
international development realm so that the country puts more emphasis on the mixture of
international CCB assistance with “developmental” normative and material interest.
Henceforth, many programmes/projects of South Korea’s international CCB assistance take
a non-security orientation. Eventually, both countries reproduce different normative
structures of international CCB assistance imposed on them in the first place. This
comparison perfectly asserts the notion of fragmentation of global cyber-norms caused by a
different process of perceiving them by countries worldwide.
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